e n t. How to deal with the OEBs. 3. OLM FBW Airbus. Operator. Airworthiness. Authority! In-service event report. Red / White OEB policy. Yes. Implement. Airbus strongly recommends that all Operators rapidly apply the OEB corrective actions as soon as they become available, particularly for red. Can anybody state the difference between between OEB and FCB in Airbus FCOM what info does an OEB have different from do.
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If you wish to contribute or participate in the discussions about articles you are invited to join SKYbrary as a registered user. Because the aircraft was operating under release to service with No 1 bleed air system inoperative and both air conditioning packs were being supplied by No 2 system, an emergency descent became necessary. It was subsequently possible to restart the failed bleed air system and the planned flight was continued to destination at a lower altitude.
It was noted that the release to service with No 1 bleed air system inoperative was allowed under MEL procedures for up to 10 days.
The incident flight was the eighth day of this ten day period and all flights since the beginning of this period had been uneventful. During the period, attempts to rectify the fault had been made but without success.
It was also noted that raising an ADD for the fault did not place any operational restrictions on the conduct of flights, although the MEL did provide the flight crew with some instructions for precautionary action prior to the flight as well as actions to take during the flight. It was noted that the First Officer had been designated as PF for the flight and that the No 2 bleed air system had failed ten minutes after reaching cruise altitude, 48 minutes after take off.
Recognising that a prompt descent would now be necessary, the aircraft commander had decided to take over as PF. After clearance to FL had been given, the ECAM Warning of High Cabin Altitude, which is triggered at a cabin altitude of feet and mandates an emergency descent, was annunciated and as per SOPsboth pilots then donned their emergency oxygen masks and the PF increased the rate of descent by extending the speed brakes.
OEB 48 abnormal v alpha prot airbus, lufthansa incident
As the descent continued, the bleed air temperature in the No 2 system cooled and the crew were successful in their attempt to reset the system 2 so that normal cabin pressurisation was restored. Noting that the engine 2 bleed air temperature was remaining within its normal limits, the PF stopped the descent at FL and, having assessed that there was sufficient fuel remaining to complete the flight to destination even at a lower level, ATC were advised that they would like to return to FL for the remainder of the journey.
Thereafter, the No 2 bleed air system temperature was observed to climb slowly until it almost reached its maximum permitted value during the last 20 minutes of the cruise. Since the cabin altitude had remained below the level which would have caused the deployment of passenger emergency oxygen masks in the cabin and they had not had to be manually deployed, the aircraft commander advised ATC that he did not deem the occurrence to be an emergency.
It was noted that the flight crew had not started the Auxiliary Power Unit Auxiliary Power Unit even though the Bleed recovery was not complete and it can independently supply an additional source of bleed air.
All that is required is that it is first started for which there are no altitude restrictions and its bleed air supply function is then selected. It was noted that by design, the A ECAM does not annunciate the failure of a remaining operative bleed air system after the other has been disabled airbs a Dual Bleed Fault.
It was considered that all bleed air system emergency instructions should have been displayed on the ECAM. A further degree of complexity involving the OEB was considered to exist because it included both pre departure flight crew instructions for reducing airbhs to a single operative bleed air system and additional aidbus after an in-flight failure.
The fault in the No 2 bleed air system was subsequently found to have originated with the failure of the Fan Air Valve FAV which controls bleed air temperature by adjusting the volume of air passing through the Pre Cooler Exchange PCE.
This would have made the risk of a bleed air overheat, for which detection and system shutdown action was controlled by the Temperature Limitation Thermostat TLThigher than usual. Bench testing by the OEM found that these parts were out of operating limits. It was noted that five separate engine bleed air system modifications had been published prior to the incident flight. InFinnair had decided to implement all these modifications as and when the components involved were removed for repairs.
In the case of the Incident aircraft, six of the ten modifications 5 modifications per engine had been completed.
A320 Red/White OEB difference?
The Investigation was advised that, as a result of the investigated incident, the modification work schedule was to be expedited.
In that respect the Investigation took the following view:.
It is important to keep the threshold for declaring an emergency as low as possible. An emergency can always be cancelled if it turns out to be disproportionate to the situation. The purpose of the legal and operational status of a declared emergency is to maximise the safety of aviation. The purpose of a MAYDAY call is to inform all possible parties, the air traffic control and any nearby aircraft of an occurrence that jeopardises the safety of aviation. With the other system being inoperative for flight, the cooling capacity of only one system proved insufficient.
The pre-cooled air was too hot, therefore the temperature sensor of the system worked as per its design and shut off the overheated system. The Final Report of the Investigation was completed on 17 January and subsequently made available in English translation.
The Investigation found that the Engine 2 system had shut down due to overheating and that access to proactive and reactive procedures related to operations with only a single bleed air system available were deficient. The crew failure to make use of APU air to help sustain cabin pressurisation during flight completion was noted.
Retrieved from ” https: On 5 Marcha Finnair Airbus A aitbus westbound in the cruise in southern Swedish airspace after despatch with Engine 1 bleed air system inoperative when the Engine 2 bleed air system failed and an emergency descent was necessary.
AirworthinessHuman FactorsLoss of Control. Inappropriate crew response technical faultManual Handling, Procedural non compliance.